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ABSTRACT
Background Effective teamwork facilitates
collective learning, which is integral to safety
culture. There are no rigorous evaluations of the
impact of team training on the four components
of safety culture—reporting, just, flexible and
learning cultures. We evaluated the impact of a
year-long team training programme on safety
culture in 24 hospitals using two theoretical
frameworks.
Methods We used two quasi-experimental
designs: a cross-sectional comparison of hospital
survey on patient safety culture (HSOPS) results
from an intervention group of 24 hospitals to a
static group of 13 hospitals and a pre-post
comparison of HSOPS results within intervention
hospitals. Dependent variables were HSOPS
items representing the four components of safety
culture; independent variables were derived from
items added to the HSOPS that measured the
extent of team training, learning and transfer.
We used a generalised linear mixed model
approach to account for the correlated nature of
the data.
Results 59% of 2137 respondents from the
intervention group reported receiving team
training. Intervention group HSOPS scores were
significantly higher than static group scores in
three dimensions assessing the flexible and
learning components of safety culture. The
distribution of the adoption of team
behaviours (transfer) varied in the intervention
group from 2.8% to 31.0%. Adoption of team
behaviours was significantly associated with
odds of an individual reacting more positively
at reassessment than baseline to nine items
reflecting all four components of safety
culture.
Conclusions Team training can result in
transformational change in safety culture when
the work environment supports the transfer of
learning to new behaviour.

INTRODUCTION
Safety culture can be defined as the
learned, shared, enduring values and
behaviours of organisation members
regarding the organisation’s willingness
to detect and learn from errors.1–3
According to Reason,4 four components
of organisational safety culture interact to
achieve learning and high reliability:
reporting culture, just culture, flexible
culture and learning culture. The knowledge, skills, attitudes, language and
coordinating mechanisms inherent in
teamwork5 create the flexibility team
members need to manage complexity6
and learn from experience.7–9 Effective
team functioning is comparable to
Reason’s flexible component of safety
culture. However, observed behaviours
are often not consistent with stated
organisational values3 because individuals
lack the knowledge, skills and management support10–12 to sustain desired
behaviours and achieve high reliability.13
Team strategies and tools to enhance
performance
and
patient
safety
(TeamSTEPPS) is a team training programme
developed
by
the
US
Department of Defense and the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) to teach the knowledge and
skills that comprise effective teamwork.
These skills are: leadership, situation
monitoring, mutual support and communication.14 There is evidence that successful team training and effective teamwork
improve patient outcomes15–22 and teamrelated dimensions of safety culture.23
However, team training alone may not
produce the desired results.24 25 A
meta-analysis found that team training
accounted for less than 20% of the
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variance in team performance.26 The primary determinant of team performance is what an organisation
does after training to sustain or routinise team behaviours.11 27 To our knowledge, there are no rigorous
evaluations of the impact of team training on all four
components of safety culture. Given the ability of
effective teamwork to facilitate collective learning,8
we hypothesise that the adoption of team behaviours
within a hospital will positively impact all components
of safety culture and contribute to transformational
culture change.28
The use of theoretical frameworks advances our
knowledge of organisational factors that are fundamental to successful implementation and sustainment of
innovations such as team training.29 The ‘Diffusion of
innovations’ framework of Rogers30 identifies characteristics of innovations, individuals and organisations
that are associated with the adoption of new ideas and
stages of adoption. The cross-sectional distribution of
adoption within individuals and organisations typically
follows a normal distribution. Based on this distribution, Rogers30 described five categories that help to
explain variation in adoption: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. When
used for evaluation purposes, these categories are standardised by deciding the number of categories to use,
the proportion of organisations to include in each category and the method of defining categories. In
general, innovator and early adopter organisations successfully implement and sustain innovations because
they tend to have slack resources, remain connected to
experts, and have champions who overcome barriers.30
These characteristics facilitate movement through
organisational stages of innovation: agenda-setting to
solve a problem, matching the problem to an innovation, redefining/restructuring the innovation to fit the
organisation, clarifying the relationship between the
organisation and the innovation, and making the
innovation routine.30
The four-level taxonomy of training criteria by
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick31 is widely used to evaluate the effectiveness of training programmes. The original taxonomy has been augmented as follows:32
▸ Level 1: Reaction to training, including satisfaction and
assessment of the utility of the training.
▸ Level 2: Learning, including immediate post-training
changes in knowledge, knowledge retention and demonstration of skill.
▸ Level 3: Transfer of learning to behaviour that is applied
in the work environment (transfer is synonymous with
the adoption of new behaviours).
▸ Level 4: Results, the degree to which desired outcomes
are achieved as a result of transfer.

Success at levels 1 to 3 increases the likelihood of
achieving level 4—desired results such as transformational change in safety culture.32
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the
impact of a team training intervention on hospital
Jones KJ, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:394–404. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-000939

safety culture. We used Kirkpatrick’s taxonomy as the
overall framework for our evaluation. As Rogers’
‘Diffusion of innovations’ framework explains variation in the adoption of new behaviours (Kirkpatrick’s
level 3—transfer), we report intervention hospital
characteristics, respondent characteristics and hospital
survey on patient safety culture (HSOPS) results
(Kirkpatrick’s level 4) by Rogers’ adopter categories.30
The linkage between these two frameworks and a
HSOPS outcome are illustrated in figure 1.
METHODS
Setting and participants

The 37 hospitals in this study were critical access hospitals located in three central US states. These hospitals served 37 distinct counties that had a median
2009 population of 7766.33 The category, ‘critical
access hospital,’ was created in 1997 by the US government to maintain access to healthcare in rural areas
by providing cost-based reimbursement for services
provided to Medicare beneficiaries. These hospitals
are limited to 25 beds and must be located more than
35 miles from another hospital;34 they comprise onefourth of the general community hospitals in the
USA.35
From 2005 to 2007, 19 of the 37 hospitals in this
study participated in our AHRQ-funded project that
sought to implement the patient safety practice of
organisational learning from voluntary medication
error reporting.36 The remaining 18 hospitals became
engaged in the improvement collaborative through the
Nebraska Office of Rural Health and hospital networks. Of the 37 hospitals, 24 had an existing baseline assessment of safety culture conducted within
18 months before the beginning of the intervention in
April 2008. These 24 agreed to participate in the
intervention. The remaining 13 did not participate in
the intervention and thus created a static group for
comparison.37 This study was approved by the
University of Nebraska Medical Center Institutional
Review Board.
Intervention description

The intervention was conducted from February 2008
to March 2009 and was intended to improve safety
culture by implementing and sustaining team behaviours in the 24 intervention hospitals. It included the
following activities:
▸ agenda-setting for improvement using the baseline
assessment of safety culture to identify weaknesses in
teamwork and communication;
▸ matching safety culture weaknesses to TeamSTEPPS
tools;
▸ conducting the TeamSTEPPS train-the-trainer course14 in
April 2008 to train master trainers for each intervention
hospital;
▸ conducting a workshop on 6 October 2008 to address
disruptive behaviour;38
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Figure 1

Evaluation of the impact of team training on safety culture using Rogers’ adopter categories.

▸ conducting a TeamSTEPPS fundamentals14 course on 7
October 2008 to train coaches to assist with implementation; and
▸ conducting 17 one-half hour conference calls to share
strategies and tools for redefining/restructuring, clarifying and routinising behaviours to sustain the innovation.
Summaries of the calls were distributed via email to
intervention hospitals.

Strategies to redefine and clarify the innovation
included focusing initial training efforts on supervisors
who then role-modelled desired behaviours by conducting briefs, huddles and debriefs. The Situation
Background Assessment and Recommendation (SBAR)
format was used to structure email communication and
fax forms to physician offices. Bulletin boards, newsletter articles and contests were used to clarify and provide
additional learning opportunities after classroom training. Strategies to routinise behaviours included auditing
the frequency with which tools were used, conducting
hospital-wide briefs, integrating the use of TeamSTEPPS
tools and strategies into new employee orientation, and
including the use of TeamSTEPPS tools in job descriptions and performance appraisals.
396

Instrument and data collection

We conducted the AHRQ HSOPS in March 2009 as a
reassessment for the intervention group of 24 hospitals and a baseline assessment for the static group of
13 hospitals. The HSOPS is a psychometrically
sound39 40 instrument developed by AHRQ to
provide healthcare organisations with a valid tool to
assess safety culture.41 It is widely used in the USA
with results from 1128 hospitals in the 2012 comparative database.42 It consists of 42 items categorised
in 12 dimensions and two items that are outcome
measures. These 44 items reflect Reason’s four components of safety culture.36
We customised the HSOPS to evaluate the impact
of patient safety interventions on safety culture in critical access hospitals. In 2005, we revised the work
areas and job titles in the demographics section to categorise staff accurately in these small hospitals.36 For
this study, we added one item to measure respondents’
extent of TeamSTEPPS training, four items to measure
learning (level 2) as knowledge of TeamSTEPPS tools,
and five items to measure transfer (level 3) as a
respondent’s perception of the frequency with which
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TeamSTEPPS tools and strategies were used. The
learning and transfer items were internally consistent
and are available on request.
To conduct the survey, key contacts at participating
hospitals provided a list of eligible employees according
to the criteria recommended in the survey user’s
guide.41 We assigned a unique identifier to each
employee that was linked to their name and hospital.
We used this linkage to: personalise the invitation to
participate in the survey (personalisation increases likelihood of response);43 calculate accurate response rates
by hospital; track change in individual responses at the
item level from baseline to reassessment; and adjust for
the correlated nature of the data. At baseline and
reassessment, we used the Dillman tailored design methodology43 to conduct the survey as a self-administered
paper instrument, as described elsewhere.36
Study design and statistical analyses

Returned surveys were scanned into a database and
imported into SAS V.9.2 for analysis. We conducted a
cross-sectional comparison of the HSOPS results from
the intervention group of 24 hospitals to the static
group of 13 hospitals and a pre-post comparison of
HSOPS results within the intervention hospitals
according to Rogers’ adopter categories.30 Due to our
small sample of 24 intervention hospitals, we collapsed Rogers’ five adopter categories into three, and
we used the quartile distribution of the perception of
transfer to achieve three balanced groups: six hospitals
were categorised as laggards, 12 as early/late majority
and six as early adopters (figure 1).
Statistical analyses to test for differences in hospital
and respondent characteristics by groups were chosen
based on the type and distribution of data. Tests used
in tables 1 and 2 are described in the footnotes. We
calculated the mean percent positive scores for
HSOPS items and dimensions for each group and category of hospitals according to the method in the
survey user’s guide.41 We determined the internal
Table 1

consistency of the survey items by calculating
Cronbach’s α coefficient for each dimension at the
hospital level, and then we averaged the hospital level
coefficients for each dimension by group and adopter
category.
All data summarising HSOPS results presented in
supplementary appendix A (available online only),
tables 3 and 4 were considered representative values
of a population of hospitals to support a broad inference. Consequently, all data were analysed using
PROC GLIMMIX (generalised linear mixed
model),44 which provides a choice of distributions for
the dependent variable, accounts for random effects
(clustering of respondents within hospitals) or correlated data (repeated measures), and provides either
subject-specific or population-averaged inferences.44
The dependent variable was an individual positive
response to a survey item, which was a binary
outcome measured pre and post-intervention. Within
PROC GLIMMIX, analysis of a binary distribution
utilises a logit link that provides OR. We used this
technique to model the OR of a respondent in an
intervention hospital reacting positively to an item at
reassessment compared to baseline (table 3), and for
each 5% increase in the proportion of respondents
reporting TeamSTEPPS training, learning and transfer
(table 4). To calculate these OR in table 3, we used
data from those respondents in the intervention group
who had both baseline and reassessment results.
Those respondents were significantly more likely to
have been at the hospital for 6 years or longer compared to those respondents without baseline data
(75% vs 37%, p<0.0001).
We chose 10 survey items to compare the odds of a
respondent reacting positively at reassessment and
baseline. These items were chosen because they assess
behaviours that reflect the four components of safety
culture such as near-miss reporting and teamwork,
and they were the least positively perceived items
within a dimension. All statistical tests were two-sided,

Characteristics of 37 hospitals participating in 2009 hospital survey on patient safety culture by group
Intervention group categories

Hospital characteristics

Static group
median
(n=13)

Intervention
group median
(n=24)

p Value*

Bed size
25
25
0.70
County population
9132
7047
0.32
Survey response rate (%)
76
81
0.84
Eligible employees
137
108
0.20
No of TeamSTEPPS master trainers NA
3
–
No of TeamSTEPPS coaches
NA
2
–
No of 17 support calls in which
NA
6
–
hospitals participated
*p Values derived from Mann–Whitney test.
**p Values derived from Kruskal–Wallis test.
TeamSTEPPS, team strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety.
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Early
adopter
median (n=6)

Early/late
majority
median (n=12)

Laggard
median
(n=6)

p Value**

25
6869
82
124.5
3.5
2.5
7

25
9592
80
108
3
1.5
9.5

21
3994
80
74.5
3
1
2.5

0.62
0.18
0.80
0.28
0.72
0.79
0.01
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Table 2

Characteristics of respondents participating in 2009 hospital survey on patient safety culture by group
Intervention group categories

Respondent characteristics
Position
Administration/management
Provider
Nurse
Allied health
Clinical support staff
Non-clinical support staff
Other
Direct patient contact
Work area
Many different departments
Acute/skilled care
Ancillary departments
Physician’s clinic
Other
Tenure at hospital
0–5 years
6–15 years
16 years or more
Tenure in profession
0–5 years
6–15 years
16 years or more
*p Values derived from χ2 tests.

Static group
mean %
(n=1328)

Intervention
group mean %
(n=2137)

11.7
6.4
27.0
21.7
9.9
15.3
8.1
77.2

10.2
5.7
32.0
23.3
11.8
11.2
5.7
80.1

13.7
22.7
42.0
10.1
11.4

10.7
25.7
47.0
9.4
7.3

41.3
32.0
26.7

41.5
33.8
24.7

28.4
32.9
38.7

28.6
34.2
37.2

p
Value*
<0.001
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.009
<0.001
–
–
–
–
–
0.35
–
–
–
0.63
–
–
–

Early adopter
mean %
(n=574)

Early/late
majority mean
% (n=1195)

Laggard
mean %
(n=368)

10.4
5.0
31.6
23.9
8.6
13.6
6.8
78.7

9.9
5.8
33.2
23.3
12.8
9.7
5.3
82.2

11.0
6.6
28.6
22.5
13.2
12.6
5.5
80.1

13.0
26.3
42.9
11.0
6.8

9.2
24.4
51.2
8.1
7.2

12.3
28.8
39.7
11.0
8.2

42.3
39.3
18.5

42.7
30.6
26.7

36.6
35.5
27.9

34.0
36.1
29.9

27.3
33.8
32.5

24.3
32.5
43.1

p
Value*
0.13
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.20
0.002
–
–
–
–
–
<0.001
–
–
–
<0.001
–
–
–

and probability values less than 0.05 were considered
statistically significant.

compared to approximately 27% in the other categories had worked at the hospital for 16 years or more.

RESULTS

Cross-sectional comparison of HSOPS results
by hospital group

Hospital and respondent characteristics

Of the 4601 personnel in the 37 hospitals who were
eligible to participate in the survey, 3465 (75.3%)
responded. Hospital characteristics are reported in
table 1. Laggard hospitals participated in a significantly fewer number of support calls than did the
other two adopter categories. Although not statistically significant, laggard hospitals had smaller numbers
of employees, smaller median bed sizes, and trained
fewer coaches than did the other two adopter
categories.
Respondent characteristics are reported in table 2.
There were statistically significant differences in the
distribution of positions and work areas and the proportion of employees with direct patient contact
between the intervention and static groups. Only the
distribution of respondents by work area, tenure at
the hospital and tenure in the profession differed significantly between the adopter categories. Of note,
19% of respondents in early adopter hospitals
398

Supplementary appendix A (available online only)
reports results for the survey dimensions, items,
internal consistency of the dimensions, and the added
training, learning and transfer items by hospital group
for the 37 hospitals. The intervention group had significantly greater positive scores than did the static
group in the survey dimensions organisational learning—continuous improvement (76% vs 71%), teamwork within departments (82% vs 80%) and
teamwork across hospital departments (67% vs 62%).
The early adopter hospitals had significantly greater
positive scores than did the early/late majority and
laggard hospitals in the survey dimensions frequency
of events reported (71% vs 65% and 56%), staffing
(76% vs 70% and 64%) and hospital management
support for patient safety (89% vs 83% and 75%).
The early adopter hospitals had significantly greater
positive scores than did the laggard hospitals in all
survey dimensions. The Cronbach’s α coefficients for
the dimensions varied across the groups from 0.57 to
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OR of responding positively in 2009 compared to baseline by adoption category for HSOPS items reflecting four components of safety culture
Early adopter (n ranges from 296–317)†

Early/late majority (n ranges from 636–
684)†

Mean % positive
HSOPS dimensions and items by components of culture

Laggard (n ranges from 177–190)†

Mean % positive

OR (95% CI)

Baseline

2009

OR (95% CI)

Baseline

2009

1.13 (0.85 to 1.49)

62

65

1.01 (0.84 to 1.22)

57

57

1.28 (1.00 to 1.65)

48

54

1.09 (0.92 to 1.30)

51

1.21 (0.89 to 1.63)

73

77

1.32** (1.09 to 1.61)

1.67** (1.18 to 2.36)

64

75

1.18 (0.92 to 1.52)

51

F5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes§

1.00 (0.77 to 1.30)

F7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital
departments§

0.73* (0.56 to 0.94)

Mean % positive
OR (95% CI)

Baseline

2009

0.85 (0.60 to1.21)

45

41

53

1.05 (0.75 to 1.45)

43

44

68

74

0.82 (0.58 to 1.16)

66

61

1.19 (0.95 to 1.49)

63

67

1.02 (0.67 to 1.57)

66

67

55

1.26** (1.06 to1.49)

45

50

0.84 (0.60 to 1.16)

46

42

61

61

0.99 (0.83 to 1.18)

54

54

0.64* (0.46 to 0.90)

55

44

64

56

1.01 (0.85 to 1.19)

49

49

0.71* (0.51 to 0.98)

49

40

1.45* (1.05 to 1.99)

75

81

1.29* (1.05 to 1.57)

68

73

1.29 (0.90 to 1.83)

60

65

1.37 (1.00 to 1.88)

77

82

1.15 (0.95 to 1.38)

68

71

1.25 (0.89 to 1.74)

58

63

1.30 (0.95 to 1.77)

78

82

1.28* (1.06 to 1.56)

72

77

1.00 (0.72 to 1.39)

61

61

65.3

68.8

59.5

62.5

54.9

52.8

Reporting culture
Frequency of events reported
D1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the
patient, how often is this reported?‡
Just culture
Non-punitive response to error
A16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file§
Flexible culture
Teamwork within departments
A11. When one area in this department gets really busy, others help out¶
Staffing
A14. We work in ‘crisis mode’ trying to do too much, too quickly§
Communication openness
C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions and actions of those with more authority¶
Hospital handoffs and transitions

Learning culture
Organisational learning
A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here¶
Hospital management support for patient safety
F9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse
event happens§
Overall perceptions of safety
A10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here§

*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
†As 1–4% of item-level data are missing at random, the n for an item varies slightly within each adopter category.
‡Most of the time and always are positive responses.
§Strongly disagree and disagree are positive responses.
¶Agree and strongly agree are positive responses.
HSOPS, hospital survey on patient safety culture.
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Table 3

2009 OR of responding positively to a HSOPS item for each 5% increase in the proportion of respondents reporting TeamSTEPPS training, learning and transfer

Dimensions and items by culture component

Some training* OR
(95% CI)

All training† OR
(95% CI)

p
Value

Learning‡ OR
(95% CI)

p
Value

Transfer§ OR
(95% CI)

0.35

1.03 (0.98 to 1.03)

0.18

1.05 (1.00 to 1.10)

0.04

1.20 (1.08 to 1.34)

0.002

0.41

1.02 (0.98 to 1.06)

0.40

1.02 (0.98 to 1.06)

0.35

1.11 (1.01 to 1.23)

0.04

0.26

1.00 (0.96 to 1.04)

0.90

1.00 (0.96 to 1.05)

0.94

1.15 (1.05–1.27)

0.005

0.17

1.03 (0.99 to 1.08)

0.15

1.06 (1.01 to 1.11)

0.02

1.11 (0.98 to 1.26)

0.09

0.17

1.01 (0.98 to 1.05)

0.41

1.02 (0.98 to 1.05)

0.28

1.11 (1.03 to 1.21)

0.01

0.18
0.22

1.03 (0.98 to 1.08)
1.031 (0.98 to 1.09)

0.25
0.22

1.05 (1.00 to 1.10)
1.05 (0.99 to 1.10)

0.07
0.08

1.22 (1.09 to 1.36)
1.19 (1.06 to 1.35)

0.001
0.006

0.19

1.04 (1.00 to 1.08)

0.04

1.06 (1.02 to 1.09)

0.006

1.20 (1.11 to 1.29)

<0.001

0.36

1.04 (0.98 to 1.10)

0.16

1.07 (1.01 to 1.13)

0.02

1.24 (1.10 to 1.41)

0.002

0.01

1.02 (0.97 to 1.07)

0.40

1.05 (1.00 to 1.11)

0.05

1.25 (1.13 to 1.40)

<0.001

and patient safety.

p
Value
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Reporting culture
Frequency of events reported
D15. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 1.02 (0.98 to 1.07)
patient, how often is this reported?††
Just culture
Non-punitive response to error
A16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file**
1.02 (0.98 to 1.06)
Flexible culture
Teamwork within departments
A11. When one area in this department gets really busy, others help out¶
1.02 (0.98 to 1.07)
Staffing
A14. We work in ‘crisis mode’ trying to do too much, too quickly**
1.03 (0.99 to 1.08)
Communication openness
C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions and actions of those with more
1.02 (0.99 to 1.06)
authority¶
Hospital handoffs and transitions
F5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes**
1.03 (0.98 to 1.09)
F7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital
1.03 (0.98 to 1.09)
departments**
Learning culture
Organisational learning
A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here¶
1.03 (0.99 to 1.06)
Hospital management support for patient safety
F9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse
1.03 (0.97 to 1.09)
event happens**
Overall perceptions of safety
A10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around
1.07 (1.02 to 1.12)
here**
*Some training, completed some TeamSTEPPS modules.
†All training, completed all TeamSTEPPS modules or master trainer.
‡Learning, correctly answered three of four TeamSTEPPS knowledge questions.
§Transfer, responded that four of five team actions are performed ‘Most of the time/always’.
¶Agree and strongly agree are positive responses.
**Strongly disagree and disagree are positive responses.
††Most of the time and always are positive responses.
HSOPS, hospital survey on patient safety culture; TeamSTEPPS, team strategies and tools to enhance performance
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0.87. The dimensions staffing and organisational
learning—continuous improvement had coefficients
below the suggested value for acceptable reliability of
0.70.45
TeamSTEPPS training and learning were significantly more prevalent in the intervention group than
the static group (59% vs 5% and 25% vs 2%, respectively). There was no statistically significant difference
between the proportions of respondents who reported
the adoption of team behaviours (transfer) in the
intervention compared to the static group (15% vs
12%). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of transfer
in the intervention hospitals by adopter categories.
Within the early adopter hospitals, an average of 83%
of respondents reported receiving training, 44%
demonstrated learning and 26% reported transfer.
These values for training, learning and transfer were
62%, 27% and 18% in early/late majority hospitals,
and 27%, 11% and 7% in laggard hospitals.
Longitudinal comparison of HSOPS results by adopter
category

Of the 2137 respondents in the intervention group,
1190 (56%) had both baseline and reassessment data.
Table 3 compares these respondents’ average baseline
and reassessment scores for 10 HSOPS items representing Reason’s four components of safety culture,
and it provides the odds of a respondent reacting
positively to an item at reassessment compared to
baseline. The average baseline scores for early adopter
hospitals were 5.8% greater than those in early/late
majority hospitals and 10.4% greater than those in
laggard hospitals. The average changes in scores from
baseline to reassessment were 3.5%, 3.0% and −2.1%
for the adopter categories, respectively.
There was variability by adopter category in the
odds of a respondent reacting positively to an item at
reassessment compared to baseline.
For early adopter respondents, the odds of reacting
positively at reassessment compared to baseline were
significantly:
▸ greater for two items that represent flexible (A14) and
learning (A9) cultures, and were
▸ less for one item representing flexible culture (F7).

For early/late majority respondents, the odds of
reacting positively at reassessment compared to baseline were significantly:
▸ greater for four items representing flexible (A11, C4)
and learning cultures (A9, A10).

For laggard respondents, the odds of reacting positively at reassessment compared to baseline were
significantly:
▸ less for two items representing flexible culture (F5, F7).
Cross-sectional comparison of HSOPS results
using Kirkpatrick’s taxonomy

Table 4 provides OR of responding positively to the
10 HSOPS items for each 5% increase in the
Jones KJ, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:394–404. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-000939

proportion of respondents reporting training, learning
(level 2) and transfer (level 3). For every 5% increase
in the proportion reporting some training in
TeamSTEPPS, there was a significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react positively to one item representing learning culture (A10).

For every 5% increase in the proportion reporting
that they had received training in all of the modules
or that they were a master trainer, there was a
significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react positively to one item representing learning culture (A9).

For every 5% increase in the proportion demonstrating that they had learned TeamSTEPPS tools,
there was a significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react positively to five items reflecting reporting (D15), flexible
(A14) and learning (A9, F9, A10) cultures.

For every 5% increase in the proportion reporting
transfer, there was a significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react positively to nine items reflecting all four components of
safety culture.

DISCUSSION
We sought to rigorously evaluate the impact of the
TeamSTEPPS team training programme on hospital
safety culture by using two designs recommended for
quasi-experimental research: comparison of results to
a static group and a pre-post comparison.46 Results
from the static group comparison (see supplementary
appendix A, available online only) indicate that the
team training intervention was associated with significantly greater hospital-level positive HSOPS scores in
three survey dimensions reflecting flexible and learning cultures. Results from the pre-post comparison
(table 3) indicate that the intervention was associated
with changes in individual respondents’ perceptions
of flexible and learning cultures, and that the direction and magnitude of these changes varies by
adopter category. In particular, individual respondents
in the early adopter and laggard hospitals were significantly less likely to have a positive perception of hospital handoffs and transitions post-intervention
compared to baseline. This decrease is consistent with
the phenomenon of response shift bias, which occurs
in pre-post comparisons when participation in an
intervention changes a respondent’s frame of reference.47 Therefore, participating in the HSOPS and
learning and/or adopting team skills may have
changed respondents’ reference point regarding what
defines an effective handoff. Participating in the
HSOPS increases awareness of patient safety concepts
and behaviours,48 and is considered a patient safety
initiative.49 Finally, the fact that 12% of respondents
in the static group reported the adoption of team
behaviours indicates the potential for response shift

401

Downloaded from qualitysafety.bmj.com on June 4, 2013 - Published by group.bmj.com

Original research
bias at reassessment if these hospitals conduct team
training.
Results from assessing the discrete impact of training, learning and transfer on safety culture (table 4)
reveal a dose–response relationship between the levels
of Kirkpatrick’s taxonomy: simply participating in
training had minimal impact on perceptions of safety
culture, learning TeamSTEPPS tools had a moderate
impact on perceptions of safety culture, and transferring learning to behaviour had the greatest impact
because it increased the odds of reacting positively to
nine of the 10 survey items reflecting all four components of safety culture. This dose–response relationship is consistent with what is referred to as the
‘transfer problem’50 51—the fact that much of the
training conducted by organisations does not produce
transfer of learning to behaviour in the work
environment.
Grossman and Salas51 have concisely reviewed the
factors that address the transfer problem. These
factors include employee characteristics (eg, motivation, perceived utility of training), the design of the
training (eg, role modelling, opportunities to practise),
and the work environment (transfer climate, support
from supervisors and peers, follow-up learning opportunities). These factors are consistent with characteristics associated with Rogers’ categories of adopters and
with movement through the organisational stages of
adoption. The design of the TeamSTEPPS training
curriculum, which was used by all intervention hospitals, is standardised and incorporates factors such as
behavioural modelling and error management known
to facilitate transfer.
There is evidence that employee characteristics and
work environments differed across the adopter categories. Employees in laggard hospitals had significantly less employee turnover than did the other
adopter categories, possibly indicating that employees
who experienced job dissatisfaction in these hospitals
remained on the job but were poorly motivated.30 52
This response is consistent with limited employment
options in isolated rural areas. The work environment
differed among the adopter groups in several ways.
First, early adopter and early/late majority hospitals
tended to be larger and remained significantly more
connected to the collaborative by participating in conference calls than did the laggard hospitals. Larger
size (indicating potentially slack resources) and a
higher degree of interconnectedness are characteristics
that are positively associated with organisational innovativeness30 and thus, transfer. Second, early adopter
and early/late majority hospitals focused on training
supervisors/managers who could then support transfer
by providing feedback, and they implemented multiple follow-up learning opportunities (bulletin
boards, newsletter articles, new employee orientation).
Finally, as indicated by baseline HSOPS scores, the
laggard hospitals began the intervention with less
402

mature safety cultures than did the early adopter and
early/late majority hospitals. The laggards did not
have as strong a foundation of management support
for patient safety and reporting and learning from
error as did the other two adopter categories.
Therefore, the laggard hospitals had the greatest need
for team training but had the least success in implementation, which reflects Rogers’ innovativeness/need
paradox—those organisations in greatest need of an
innovation are the last to adopt.30
Strengths and limitations

There are several strengths that support our ability to
draw a causal inference between the intervention and
changes in perceptions of safety culture. We established that the reliability of the HSOPS in our sample
of critical access hospitals was comparable to that
reported for other populations.40 49 53 We used two
quasi-experimental designs thus limiting potential
confounding due to maturation and history. We conducted the HSOPS within each hospital in a standardised manner enabling us to pool the results validly.
Because we linked baseline and reassessment responses
at the individual level, we were able to compare posttraining to pre-training results and assess the impact
of discrete changes in training, learning and transfer
on safety culture. We allowed nearly a year for the
intervention to produce the desired result of change
in safety culture.31 We used appropriate statistical
techniques to account for the correlated nature of the
data at the hospital and respondent levels,46 and we
prospectively used two theoretical frameworks to
guide our analysis and interpretation.29 Finally, the
median response rates for all hospital groups were
76% and greater thus minimising non-response bias.
There are limitations that may affect the interpretation of these results. As with many quality improvement initiatives, these hospitals self-selected to
participate, they were not randomly assigned to the
intervention and static groups, and we did not independently audit the prevalence of team behaviours.
There was variability in the extent to which each hospital followed the TeamSTEPPS curriculum within
their hospital and implemented their action plan for
implementation and sustainment. This study was conducted in critical access hospitals, which may limit its
generalisability to larger hospitals. However, the consistency of our findings with theoretical frameworks
tends to mitigate these limitations. In addition, the
small size of these hospitals made it reasonable to
assume that culture change could occur within a year.
Finally, we had limited power to detect differences
between adopter categories due to small sample size.
CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Team training can result in transformational change in
safety culture when the work environment supports
transfer of learning to behaviour. First, this work
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environment must include a foundation of reporting
and learning from error. Second, managers and senior
leaders should understand that we ‘learn to team’
because teamwork is essential for learning, adapting,
and providing safe care in the current complex healthcare environment.54 Without this knowledge, midlevel managers will not role model team behaviours
and senior leaders will not allocate the financial and
human resources needed to sustain ongoing training
that includes learning opportunities such as newsletters, new employee orientation, annual refresher
courses and opportunities to practise including simulation. Senior leaders must also ensure that team behaviours are routinised by revising job descriptions and
performance appraisals to include team behaviours. In
summary, the laggards in our study were in greatest
need of teamwork, but were least likely to adopt
because their work environment did not support
training, learning, or transfer. Additional research is
needed to understand the barriers to establishing a
work environment that supports the transfer of team
training in hospitals.

1 Health and Safety Commission. Organising for safety: third
report of the human factors study group of ACSNI. Sudbury,
UK: HSE Books, 1993.
2 Wiegmann DA, Zhang H, von Thaden T, et al. A synthesis of
safety culture and safety climate research. http://www.aviation.
illinois.edu/avimain/papers/research/pub_pdfs/techreports/0203.pdf (accessed 3 Jan 2013).
3 Schein EH. Organizational culture and leadership, 4th edn.
San Francisco, CA: Josey-Bass, 2010.

4 Reason J. Managing the risks of organizational accidents.
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1997.
5 Salas E, Sims DE, Burke CS. Is there a ‘Big Five’ in teamwork?
Small Group Res 2005;36:555–99.
6 Cannon-Bowers JA, Salas E. Team performance and training in
complex environments: recent findings from applied research.
Curr Dir Psychol Sci 1998;7:83–7.
7 Senge PM. The fifth discipline: the art & practice of the
learning organization. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990.
8 Edmonson AC. Learning from failure in Health Care: frequent
opportunities, pervasive barriers. Qual Saf Health Care
2004;12(Suppl. II):ii3–9.
9 Salas E, Rosen MA, Burke CS, et al. The wisdom of collectives
in organizations: an update of the teamwork competencies. In:
Salas E, Goodwin GF, Burke CS, eds. Team effectiveness in
complex organizations: cross-disciplinary perspectives and
approaches. New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group,
2009: 39–79.
10 Frankel AS, Leonard MW, Denham CR. Fair and just culture,
team behavior, and leadership engagement: the tools to achieve
high reliability. Health Serv Res 2006;41:1690–709.
11 Helfrich CD, Weiner BJ, McKinney MM, et al. Determinants
of implementation effectiveness: adapting a framework for
complex innovations. Med Care Res Rev 2007;64:279–303.
12 Singer SJ, Hayes J, Cooper JB, et al. A case for safety
leadership team training of hospital managers. Health Care
Manage Rev 2011;36:188–200.
13 Baker DP, Day R, Salas E. Teamwork as an essential component
of high-reliability organizations. Health Serv Res
2006;41:1576–98.
14 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. TeamSTEPPS:
strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety.
http://www.teamstepps.ahrq.gov (accessed 12 Jul 2010).
15 Deering S, Rosen MA, Ludi V, et al. On the front lines of
patient safety: implementation and evaluation of team training
in Iraq. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2011;37:350–6.
16 Friedman DM, Berger DL. Improving team structure and
communication: a key to hospital efficiency. Arch Surg
2004;139:1194–8.
17 Mayer CM, Cluff L, Lin WT, et al. Evaluating efforts to
optimize TeamSTEPPS implementation in surgical and
pediatric intensive care units. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf
2011;37:365–74.
18 Mukamel DB, Temkin-Greener H, Delavan R, et al. Team
performance and risk-adjusted health outcomes in the Program
of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE). Gerontologist
2006;46:227–37.
19 Neily J, Mills PD, Young-Xu Y, et al. Association between
implementation of a medical team training program and
surgical mortality. JAMA 2010;304:1693–700.
20 Strasser DC, Falconer JA, Stevens AB, et al. Team training and
stroke rehabilitation outcomes: a cluster randomized trial. Arch
Phys Med Rehabil 2008;89:10–15.
21 Young MP, Gooder VJ, Oltermann MH, et al. The impact of a
multidisciplinary approach on caring for ventilator-dependent
patients. Int J Qual Health Care 1998;10:15–26.
22 Percarpio KB, Harris FS, Hatfield BA, et al. Code debriefing
from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Team
Training program improves the cardiopulmonary resuscitation
code process. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2010;36:424–9.
23 Weaver SJ, Rosen MA, DiazGranados D, et al. Does teamwork
improve performance in the operating room? A multilevel
evaluation. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2010;36:133–42.

Jones KJ, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:394–404. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-000939

403

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank

Andrea Bowen, DPT, for her assistance in data
management and editing and Victoria Kennel, MA,
for her assistance in clarifying concepts in the
discussion.
Contributors KJJ and AMS contributed to the

conception, design, analysis and interpretation of the
data as well as drafting and revising the article. RRP
contributed to the interpretation of the data, and to
the drafting and revising of the article. RH
contributed to the analysis and interpretation of the
data as well as drafting and revising the article. All
authors approved of the final revisions.
Funding This research was funded by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (1 U18 HS015822)
and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services.
Competing interests None.
Ethics approval This study was approved by the

University of Nebraska Medical Center Institutional
Review Board.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned;
externally peer reviewed.

REFERENCES

Downloaded from qualitysafety.bmj.com on June 4, 2013 - Published by group.bmj.com

Original research
24 Riley W, Davis S, Miller K, et al. Didactic and simulation
nontechnical skills team training to improve perinatal patient
outcomes in a community hospital. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf
2011;37:357–64.
25 Siassakos D, Draycott TJ, Crofts JF, et al. More to teamwork
than knowledge, skill and attitude. Br J Obstet Gynaecol
2010;117:1262–9.
26 Salas E, DiazGranados D, Klein C, et al. Does team training
improve team performance? A meta-analysis. Hum Factors
2008;50:903–33.
27 Eccles MP, Mittman BS. Welcome to implementation science.
Implement Sci 2006;1:1.
28 Leape L, Berwick D, Clancy C, et al. Transforming healthcare:
a safety imperative. Qual Saf Health Care 2009;18:424–8.
29 Eccles M, Grimshaw J, Walker A, et al. Changing the behavior
of healthcare professionals: the use of theory in promoting the
uptake of research findings. J Clin Epidemiol 2005;58:107–12.
30 Rogers EM. Diffusion of innovations, 5th edn. New York: Free
Press, 2003.
31 Kirkpatrick DL, Kirkpatrick JD. Evaluating training programs:
the four levels, 3rd edn. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, Inc., 2006.
32 Alliger GM, Tannenbaum SI, Bennett W, et al. A meta-analysis
of the relations among training criteria. Pers Psychol
1997;50:341–58.
33 US Census Bureau. Population Estimates. County Totals:
Vintage 2009. http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/
totals/2009/index.html (accessed 15 Feb 2012).
34 Flex Monitoring Team. About the Flex Program and Critical
Access Hospitals . http://www.flexmonitoring.org/aboutcahflex.
shtml (accessed 2 Dec 2010).
35 Flex Monitoring Team. CAH Information. http://www.
flexmonitoring.org/cahlistRA.cgi (accessed 21 Feb 2012).
36 Jones KJ, Skinner A, Xu L, et al. The AHRQ hospital survey
on patient safety culture: a tool to plan and evaluate patient
safety programs. In: Henriksen K, Battles JB, Keyes MA, et al.
eds. Advances in patient safety: new directions and alternative
approaches. (Vol. 2: Culture and Redesign). Rockville, MD:
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2008.
37 Campbell D, Stanley J. Experimental and quasi-experimental
designs for research. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1963.
38 Rosenstein AH, O’Daniel M. Invited article: managing
disruptive physician behavior: impact on staff relationships and
patient care. Neurology 2008;70:1564–70.

404

39 Colla JB, Bracken AC, Kinney LM, et al. Measuring patient
safety climate: a review of surveys. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:364–6.
40 Sorra JS, Dyer N. Multilevel psychometric properties of the
AHRQ hospital survey on patient safety culture. BMC Health
Serv Res 2010;10:199.
41 Sorra JS, Nieva VF. Hospital survey on patient safety culture.
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/hospculture/hospcult.pdf (accessed
23 Feb 2008).
42 Sorra J, Famolaro T, Dyer N, et al. Hospital Survey on Patient
Safety Culture 2012 user comparative database report. (Prepared
by Westat, Rockville, MD, under Contract No. HHSA
290200710024C). 2012; AHRQ Publication No. 12-0017.
43 Dillman DA. Mail and internet surveys: the tailored design
method. 2nd edn. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 2007.
44 SAS. The GLIMMIX Procedure, June 2006. SAS The Power to
Know Web site. http://www.support.sas.com/rnd/app/papers/
glimmix.pdf (accessed 21 Feb 2012).
45 Cronbach L. Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of
tests. Psychometrika 1951;16:297–334.
46 Dawson JD. Quantitative analytical methods in translation
research. Worldviews Evid Based Nurs 2004;1(Suppl. 1):S60–4.
47 Howard GS. Response-shift bias: a problem in evaluating
interventions with pre/post self-reports. Eval Rev 1980;4:93–106.
48 Nieva VF, Sorra J. Safety culture assessment: a tool for
improving patient safety in healthcare organizations. Qual Saf
Health Care 2003;12(Suppl. 2):ii17–23.
49 Vlayen A, Hellings J, Claes N, et al. A nationwide Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture in Belgian hospitals: setting
priorities at the launch of a 5-year patient safety plan. BMJ
Qual Saf 2012;21:760–7.
50 Baldwin TT, Ford JK. Transfer of training: a review and
directions for future research. Pers Psychol 1988;41:63–105.
51 Grossman R, Salas E. The transfer of training: what really
matters. Int J Train Dev 2011;15:103–20.
52 Zhou J, George JM. When job dissatisfaction leads to
creativity: encouraging the expression of voice. Acad Manage J
2001;44:682–96.
53 Sarac C, Flin R, Mearns K, et al. Hospital survey on patient
safety culture: psychometric analysis on a Scottish sample. BMJ
Qual Saf 2011;20:842–8.
54 Edmondson AC. Teaming: how organizations learn, innovate,
and compete in the knowledge economy. San Francisco: John
Wiley & Sons, 2012.

Jones KJ, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:394–404. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-000939

Downloaded from qualitysafety.bmj.com on June 4, 2013 - Published by group.bmj.com

A theory-driven, longitudinal evaluation of
the impact of team training on safety culture
in 24 hospitals
Katherine J Jones, Anne M Skinner, Robin High, et al.
BMJ Qual Saf 2013 22: 394-404 originally published online February
23, 2013

doi: 10.1136/bmjqs-2012-000939

Updated information and services can be found at:
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/22/5/394.full.html

These include:

Data Supplement

"Supplementary Data"
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/suppl/2013/02/22/bmjqs-2012-000939.DC1.html

References

This article cites 35 articles, 12 of which can be accessed free at:
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/22/5/394.full.html#ref-list-1

Article cited in:
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/22/5/394.full.html#related-urls

Email alerting
service

Topic
Collections

Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in
the box at the top right corner of the online article.

Articles on similar topics can be found in the following collections
Editor's choice (60 articles)

Notes

To request permissions go to:
http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions

To order reprints go to:
http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform

To subscribe to BMJ go to:
http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/

